Abstract-Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) are a class of networks characterized by lack of guaranteed connectivity, typically low frequency of encounters between DTN nodes and long propagation delays within the network. As a result, the message propagation process in DTNs follows a store-carryand-forward manner, and the in-transit bundle messages can be opportunistically routed towards the destinations through intermittent connections under the hypothesis that each individual DTN node is willing to help with forwarding. Unfortunately, there may exist some selfish nodes, especially in a cooperative network like DTN, and the presence of selfish DTN nodes could cause catastrophic damage to any well designed opportunistic routing scheme and jeopardize the whole network. In this paper, to address the selfishness problem in DTNs, we propose a practical incentive protocol, called Pi, such that when a source node sends a bundle message, it also attaches some incentive on the bundle, which is not only attractive but also fair to all participating DTN nodes. With the fair incentive, the selfish DTN nodes could be stimulated to help with forwarding bundles to achieve better packet delivery performance. In addition, the proposed Pi protocol can also thwart various attacks, which could be launched by selfish DTN nodes, such as free ride attack, layer removing and adding attacks. Extensive simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed Pi protocol in terms of high delivery ratio and lower average delay.
I. INTRODUCTION

D
ELAY Tolerant Networks (DTNs), such as space communication and networking in sparsely populated areas [1] , vehicular ad hoc networks [2] - [5] , and underwater networks [6] , have been subject to extensive research efforts in recent years. Different from the traditional networks, the newly emerging DTNs are characterized by the lack of guaranteed connectivity, the typically low frequency of encounters by DTN nodes and long propagation delays within the network [1, 7] . For example, the in-transit messages in DTNs, also called bundles, as shown in Fig. 1 , could only be forwarded when two DTN nodes (N , N ) move within each other's transmission range and contact with each other during a period of time. If no other DTN node is within the transmission range of DTN node N , N will buffer the current bundles and carry them until other DTN node appears within its transmission range. Therefore, the bundle propagation process in DTNs follows a "store-carry-and-forward" manner [8] and the bundles are opportunistically routed toward the destinations by intermittent connections. The opportunistic data propagation in DTNs has been well studied so far, and several efficient opportunistic routing protocols have been proposed under the hypothesis that each individual DTN node is willing to forward bundles for others [6, 9, 10] . However, when DTN nodes are controlled by rational entities, such as human or organization [11, 12] , some DTN nodes will behave selfishly and may not be willing to help others to forward bundles, so the hypothesis will be violated [13, 14] . For example, in order to conserve power, buffer and computing resources, a selfish DTN node may be reluctant in the cooperation that is not directly beneficial to it, which could make a well designed opportunistic routing useless. Therefore, how to efficiently and effectively resolve the selfishness problem in DTNs has become a very challenging issue to achieve better packet delivery performance of DTNs.
To stimulate the possible selfish nodes to forward packets, many reputation-based and credit-based incentive protocols for wireless ad hoc network have been proposed [15] - [22] . However, due to the unique features of DTNs, such as the lack of contemporaneous path and high variation in network conditions, it is hard to detect DTN nodes' selfish behaviors or predetermine a routing path. Therefore, these challenges in DTNs make the existing incentive protocols, which usually rely on a contemporaneous routing, not applicable to DTNs.
In this paper, in order to improve the performance of the 1536-1276/10$25.00 c ⃝ 2010 IEEE DTNs in terms of high delivery ratio and low average delay, we propose a Practical incentive (Pi) protocol to address the selfishness problem in DTNs. In the proposed protocol, when the source DTN node sends a bundle, it doesn't set a routing path in advance, but only need to attach some incentive on the bundle. Then, the selfish DTN nodes on the road could be stimulated to help with forwarding the bundle to improve the delivery ratio and reduce the average delay of the whole DTNs. Specifically, the contributions of this paper are threefold.
• First, we provide a fair incentive model in which selfish DTN nodes are stimulated to help forward bundles with credit-based incentive as well as reputation-based incentive. In the reward model, to achieve fairness, if and only if the bundles arrive at the destination node, the intermediate forwarding nodes can get credits from the source node. Furthermore, for the failure of bundle forwarding, those intermediate forwarding nodes still can get good reputation values from a trusted authority (TA). Therefore, with this stimulation, the packet delivery performance of DTNs can be improved. To the best of our knowledge, no previously reported stimulation schemes provide the fairness in DTNs.
• Second, in order to guarantee the feasibility of the fair incentive model, we use the layered coin model [14, 23] and verifiably encrypted signature techniques [24, 25] to provide authentication and integrity protection in the proposed Pi protocol.
• Third, to confirm the effectiveness of the proposed Pi protocol, we also develop a custom simulator built in Java to substantially show that the proposed Pi protocol can achieve the high delivery ratio and low average delay of DTNs when the high incentive is provided. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formalize the network model, the node model, and identify the design goal. Then, we present the Pi protocol in Section III, followed by the security analysis and performance evaluation in Section IV and Section V, respectively. We also review related work in Section VI. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section VII.
II. MODELS AND DESIGN GOAL
In this section, we formalize the network model, the node model, and identify the design goal.
A. Network Model
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) are typically characterized by the unguaranteed connectivity and the low frequency of encounters between a given pair of nodes within the network [1] . In our model, we consider a DTN as a directed graph = ( , ), where and represent the set of DTN nodes and opportunistic contact edges, respectively. In the DTN, a source S can deliver packets to a destination D via the movement of DTN nodes with proper data forwarding algorithm. Currently, contingent upon whether they allow multiple copies of a message relaying within the network, the existing data forwarding algorithms may be categorized into single-copy and multi-copy algorithms. In the single-copy algorithm [10] , only one copy is relayed in the network until it arrives at the destination. While in the multi-copy algorithms, such as flooding or spray routing [6] , more than one copy are relayed in the networks. Due to large number of message copies in the networks, this kind of approach consumes a high amount of resources which are scarce in DTNs. In this work, in order to clearly illustrate the practical incentive, we just consider a single-copy data forwarding algorithm, i.e., for each bundle B, only one copy is initially spread by the source S, then the only copy is opportunistically relayed from one forwarding node to another until its reaching the destination D.
B. Node Model
In DTNs, the selfish behaviors of DTN nodes are naturally caused by human entities who control them [11, 12] . In our model, in order to study the selfish DTN nodes in a nonabstract fashion, we take vehicular ad hoc network as a concrete delay tolerant network -vehicular DTN, where each DTN node is instantiated by vehicle driven by people running in a city environment with some velocity. In the rest of this paper, we will use the terms "node" and "vehicle" interchangeably to refer to the same DTN entity.
In vehicular DTNs, each vehicle is equipped with On Board Unit (OBU) communication device, which allows different vehicles to communicate with each other based on the 802.11p protocol [2] . Note that the 802.11p physical layer offers different bitrates, ranging from 3 to 27 Mbps, from which OBU devices can choose [26] . Therefore, when two vehicles are within the transmission range, e.g., 300 meters, they can exchange bundles [2] . In general, a vehicle is almost resourceunlimited, while the equipped OBU communication device is considered resource-constrained, i.e., buffer and computation power constraints [27] . Therefore, there may exist many selfish DTN nodes in the networks. In order to conserve buffer space, these selfish DTN nodes may be very reluctant in the cooperation that is not directly beneficial to them. As a result, the selfishness would be against the goal of the vehicular DTN to cooperatively deliver a bundle from its source S to the destination D. Therefore, the cooperation probability of a selfish DTN node can be modeled as follows
where 0 ≤ ≤ 1 is the selfish factor, < 1 is the cooperation probability under selfish condition, i.e., = 0.01, while = 1 denotes the unselfish cooperation probability. Clearly, if = 0, a DTN node is unselfish, i.e., it is always willing to help with forwarding with probability = 1. On the contrary, if = 1, the DTN node is selfish, the cooperation probability is just = = 0.01. Therefore, the smaller the selfish factor , the better the cooperation in DTNs.
C. Design Goal
Our design goal is to develop a practical incentive protocol to stimulate the selfish DTN nodes to improve the cooperation probability in the networks. Specifically, the following two desirable objectives will be achieved.
• Improving DTN's performance with stimulation: In order to prevent the overall performance degradation, i.e., low delivery ratio and high average delay, due to the selfish DTN nodes in DTNs, the credit-based incentive strategy is adopted. Similar to [14] , the basic strategy is to provide incentives for intermediate forwarding DTN nodes to faithfully forward bundles. Generally, the intermediate nodes will get paid for bundle forwarding from the other nodes, and will take the same payment mechanism to pay for their bundle forwarding requests, by which the overall performance (i.e., high delivery ratio and low average delay) of the DTNs can be assured. 1) Incentive Strategy: To achieve the above objectives, the following hybrid incentive strategy is adopted.
• There exists a trusted authority (TA) in the system similar to [20] . Although it does not participate in bundle forwarding in DTNs, TA performs trusted fair credit and reputation clearance for DTN nodes. Therefore, before joining the DTNs, each DTN node should register itself to the TA and obtain its personal credit account (PCA) and personal reputation account (PRA) in the initialization phase. Later, when a DTN node has an available fast connection to the TA, it can report to the TA for credit and/or reputation clearance [20] . 
will decrease with the time. The larger the parameter , the quicker the reputation value R ( ) decreases. Therefore, in order to keep/increase good reputation values, this fair incentive strategy is attractive to each DTN node. The design of reward calculation is the pivot of a practical incentive protocol, which should guide the selfish DTN nodes to follow the protocol to help with forwarding bundles. In the incentive model, the following reward calculation is exercised: once an intermediate DTN node
helped forward a bundle for distance, it can get a reward either ⋅ C + ⋅ R if the bundle B arrives at the destination finally or ⋅ R otherwise, i.e.,
(2) where C is a unit incentive credit provided by the source , R is a fixed unit reputation value defined by the TA for optimizing the network. Assume that C is the unit resource cost used for forwarding. We define the gaining factor of DTN node as
and redefine the cooperation probability of with reputation value as
end if (4) Then, with the cooperation probability , the DTN node is interested in helping forward the bundle. Note that, when ≥ ℎ , different intermediate DTN node may have different initial selfish factor . Therefore, to guarantee the success of stimulation on all intermediate DTN nodes, the source can choose a large C (i.e., large gaining factor ) in its incentive policy such that each − can be minimal. In addition, since Reward is a linear increase function of in Eq. (2), the longer the , the more the Reward . Therefore, the intermediate node is willing to forward the bundle as long as possible.
2) Layered Coin Model: To guarantee the incentive strategy working well, the incentive must be secure. Therefore, in the implementation, we use the layered coin to stimulate the bundle delivery [14, 23] . A typical layered coin usually consists of a base layer formed by the source node and multiple endorsed layers formed by the intermediate nodes. Fig. 2 shows an example of layered coin architecture, where ( , ), ( , ), ( , ) are the source node and its location, the destination node and its location, and the -th intermediate node and the location that it contacts with the + 1-th node, respectively.
is the incentive policy provided by the source node , , , and refer to the time-to-live information, the timestamp, and the signature, respectively. includes the source's reputation value signed by TA and the incentive policy in this bundle packet forwarding, i.e., the incentive in Eq. (2), and the signatures 0 , 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ can witness the cooperation among DTN nodes while preventing possible malicious nodes from disrupting the system.
Overhead of layered coin. Except the signature fields, we assume the field is 64-byte length, and all other fields are 8-byte length, then the overhead of a -layered coin is around 120 + 32 ⋅ + | | ⋅ ( + 2) bytes, where | | denotes the length of adopted signature.
III. PRACTICAL INCENTIVE PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose Pi protocol, which consists of four parts: system initialization, bundle generation, bundle forwarding, and charging and rewarding. Before describing them, we first review the bilinear pairing technique [28] , which is a mature cryptographic technique and serves as the basis of the proposed Pi protocol.
A. Bilinear Pairing
Let , be two multiplicative cyclic groups of the same prime order . Suppose and are equipped with a pairing, i.e., a non-degenerated and efficiently computable bilinear map :
. In group , the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is considered to be hard, i.e., given ⟨ , , ⟩ for ∈ and unknown , ∈ ℤ * , there is no algorithm running in expected polynomial time, which can compute with non-negligible probability, while the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is easy, i.e., given ⟨ , , , ⟩ for ∈ and unknown , , ∈ ℤ * , it is easy to judge whether = mod by checking ( , ) ? = ( , ). We refer to [24, 25, 28] for a more comprehensive description of pairing technique, and complexity assumptions.
Definition 1: A bilinear parameter generator is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter as input, and outputs a 5-tuple ( , , , , ) where is a -bit prime number, , are two groups with order , ∈ is a generator, and : × → is a non-degenerated and efficiently computable bilinear map.
B. The Pi Protocol 1) System Initialization:
We assume that all DTN nodes = { 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ } and TA are using the same suite of system parameters. Given the security parameter , the bilinear parameters ( , , , , ) are first generated by running ( ). Then, a cryptographic hash function : {0, 1} * → ℤ * and a secure symmetric encryption algorithm ℰ() are chosen [28] . In the end, the system parameter params = ( , , , , , , ℰ) are published. Each DTN node with a unique identity ∈ chooses a random number ∈ ℤ * as its private key and computes the corresponding public key as = . At the same time, each DTN node ∈ also registers its personal credit account (PCA) and personal reputation account (PRA) to the TA. Note that, all public keys in the system should be certified by public key certificates issued by certificate authority (CA). In addition, each DTN node's reputation value during a period is signed by TA and anyone can check it.
2) Bundle Generation: When a source node with the private-public key pair ( , = ) at location wants to send a bundle to the destination node with the key pair ( , = ) at location , will run the following steps.
Step 1. Compute the static shared key = = between and , and encrypt the bundle into B = ℰ ( ) to achieve confidentiality.
Step 2. Determine a proper incentive policy (IP) as in Eq. as an Interest Acknowledgement (ACK), and sends * 1 and 1 to the source node . After receiving * 1 and 1 , the source node runs the next steps.
Step 3. Verify the validity of ACK by checking the equation ( * 1 ,
. Otherwise, neglects the ACK. 
After verifying 1 =
by checking ( 1 ,
= ( , ), 1 begins to forward the bundle.
3) Bundle Forwarding: When approaching to the location 1 , the intermediate node 1 considers it can't carry the bundle B close to the destination node any more and forwards the bundle to the next-hop DTN node by running the Algorithm 1. Likewise, each subsequent forwarding node also uses the Algorithm 1 to forward the bundles. Without loss of generality, the bundle B finally arrives at the destination node by opportunistic bundle forwarding with the routing
→ , as shown in Fig. 3 . In the following, the detailed bundle forwarding protocol is described. At the location , the intermediate node , 1 ≤ ≤ − 1, is ready to forward the bundle to the next-hop node +1 , the following steps are executed.
Step 1. When the intermediate node +1 is interested in forwarding the bundle B, it first checks the source 's reputation value embedded in and the validity of ( 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ). If the source's reputation value is acceptable and
) 1 (6) as an ACK to the N .
Step 2. After receiving the ACK * +1 , the intermediate node checks
If it holds, computes (8) and sets the -th endorsed layer as EL = ( || || +1 || || +1 ) and forwards the bundle packet B to the next node +1 as follows
Step 3. After verifying the validity of +1 by checking 
and sends +1 back to the last intermediate node . After verifying the validity of +1 by checking ( +1 ,
) to the TA for clearance in the future.
4) Charging and Rewarding:
When the last intermediate node has an available fast connection to the TA, reports ( 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ) to the TA, then the TA performs the fair credit and reputation clearance as the following steps.
Step 1. TA checks the freshness and the validity of ( 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , +1 ). If they are fresh and valid, TA continues; otherwise terminates the operation.
Step 2. , TA can compute the relay distance, and store the merited reputation values to 's PRA.
Correctness. The correctness of 0 , 1 and +1 are given as follows: 
Similarly, the correctness of * can also be checked. Then, due to the hybrid incentives, the DTN nodes will be stimulated to faithfully forward the bundles to the destination nodes in a cooperative fashion.
Communication Overhead. Similar to the BLS signature [29] , each signature , = 0, 1, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , can be implemented as short as 160 bits ( = 20 bytes). Then, the overhead oflayered coin is 160 + 52 ⋅ bytes. When = 20 is assumed, the overhead of layered coin is only 1, 200 bytes (≈ 1.17 Kb). Assume each bundle is 2 Mb or more, then the overhead of layered coin is much smaller than 2 Mb and acceptable for providing security in vehicular DTNs.
Aggregation and Batch Verification. In the proposed Pi protocol, each signature's signing cost is very low, only exponentiation operation is required. However, since the verification requires pairing operation, the computation cost becomes a little higher, but still less than 20 ms [2] . In order to further reduce the communication and computation overheads, the signatures 2 , 3 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , in the proposed Pi protocol can be aggregated as
Then, the aggregated signature can be batch-verified as
Clearly, the correctness of Eq. (16) directly follows from Eq. (14) . Because the signatures 0 , 1 are provably secure in the random oracle model [24, 25] and the CDH problem is also assumed hard in , the signature in Eq. (14) is secure. Then, the security of = ∑ −1
=1
+1 also follows. More details on security proof of can be found in [24, 25] .
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss security issues of the proposed Pi protocol, i.e., the fairness issue in stimulation, the free ride attack [21] , the layer removing attack [14] , and the layer adding attack. Note that, since the proposed Pi protocol only deals with the selfish DTN nodes in DTNs, other attacks launched by malicious DTN nodes are out of the scope of this paper.
• The proposed Pi protocol provides fair incentive. In the charging and rewarding phase, if i) a bundle is really relayed to the destination node, the source node will pay credits to those intermediate nodes for forwarding. However, if ii) the bundle fails to reach the destination node, the source node won't pay any credits. Therefore, it is fair to the source node. For the intermediate nodes, although they can't get credits for their forwarding in case ii), they still can increase their good reputation values from the TA. When the gaining factor is large, those intermediate nodes still feel fair for bundle forwarding. In addition, since the provably secure short signature schemes are employed [24, 25] , the authentications from the signatures can provide strong witnesses. If an intermediate node didn't participate in forwarding, it can't get any reward. Therefore, from the above analysis, the proposed Pi protocol can provide fair incentive in the DTN network.
• The proposed Pi protocol is resistent to the free riding attack. The free riding attack is a notorious selfish attack in DTN, which is conducted by two selfish DTN nodes that attempt to exchange messages without paying their credits [21] . If these two DTN selfish nodes are neighbor, this attack makes no sense, since they can directly exchange messages without the aid of others. When there is at least one normal node residing between them, launching such an attack is possible. Assume that the intermediate node wants to send message ′ to +2 by piggybacking it with the forwarded bundle packet (B, BL, EL 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , EL ). Since the signature
can provide the integrity protection on (M 0 , B), the free riding message ′ will not pass the verification equation. Thus, the intermediate node +1 can detect the free riding message ′ and delete it before passing the bundle message to the node +2 . As a result, the proposed Pi protocol is resistant to the free riding attack in the DTN network.
• The proposed Pi protocol is resistent to the layer removing attack. The layer removing attack [14] from the source node. Therefore, it can be detected. If two selfish intermediate nodes launch the second kind of removing layer attack, those removed intermediated nodes can provide their witnesses to prove their participation. Thus, the selfish nodes will also be detected, and their reputation values will decrease. A special removing layer attack, as shown in Fig. 4 , is the last intermediate node colludes with the source node to remove all previous layers for enabling the source node to pay less rewarding credits. However, this special attack is still hard to launch. This is because the source node doesn't know the last intermediate node in advance in the DTN network. Even though knows and provides =
to , it can't deny its signing
. Therefore, the selfish behaviors of and in this special case can also be detected.
• The proposed Pi protocol is resistent to the layer adding attack. If a system allows a DTN node with multiple identities, then the layer adding attack could be launched. The layer adding attack refers to a selfish intermediate node with multiple identities adds some additional layers with its different identities on i) the same forwarding path or ii) detour the forwarding path to maximize its credits, as shown in Fig. 4 . However, in the proposed Pi protocol, the Reward = ⋅ C + ⋅ R increases linearly with . If these additional layers don't enlarge the actual distance as in case i), the selfish node still can't get more credits. In case ii), although increases, TA can detect these forwarding nodes * , + , − are the same node at charging and rewarding phase, since the trusted authority TA knows all DTN node's PCA and PRA. In our system, since one DTN node holds only one unique identifer, and multiple identities are not allowed, this attack is prevented. Note that in DTN network, more than one DTN nodes collude with each other to launch layer adding attack is a malicious attack, how to resist it is still a challenging issue.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we study the performance of the proposed Pi protocol using a custom simulator built in Java. The performance metrics used in the evaluation are i) the delivery ratio, which is the fraction of generated messages that are correctly delivered to the final destination within a given time period; 2) the average delay, which is defined as the average time between when a message is generated at some source and when it is successfully delivered to its destination. Both delivery ratio and average delay can be used to examine the ability of the proposed Pi protocol with some incentive strategy to deliver the bundle to the destination within a specified period.
A. Simulation Settings
In the simulations, total DTN nodes with a transmission radius of 300 meters are first uniformly deployed in an area of 6,000 m × 15,000 m, as shown in Fig. 5 , to simulate a sparse vehicular DTN.
Mobility model. In vehicular DTNs, the performance of bundle forwarding is highly contingent upon the mobility of vehicles. Since vehicles are usually driven along the roads in a city, we assume each DTN node follows the shortest path map based movement routing. Specifically, each vehicle first randomly chooses a destination in the area, and gets there using the shortest route with the average velocity . After reaching the destination, with 2-minute pause time, the vehicle randomly chooses a new destination and repeats the above.
Selfish ratio. Let = the number of selfish DTN nodes the total number of DTN nodes be the selfish ratio (SR) among these DTN nodes, which usually is a variable based on how many DTN nodes that behave selfishly in the network [30] . Once a DTN node is selfish, then according to Eq. (4), it may refuse to forward the bundle packets if the gaining factor is less than its selfish factor when ≥ ℎ . However, with some incentives, i.e., the gaining factor in Eq. (4) is increased, the selfish node may faithfully forward. Note that, in our simulation, we do not consider the case that < ℎ . The reason is that, when < ℎ , the selfish nodes will faithfully forward the bundles, which is equivalent to lowering the selfish ratio in the simulation. The detailed parameter settings in the simulations are summarized in Table I . We perform the experiments for the specified period varying from 1 hour to 12 hours with increment of 1 hour. For each case, we run the simulation 10 times, and the average delivery ratio and average delay are reported.
B. Simulation Results
In Fig. 6 , we compare the delivery ratio of the sampled DTN networks in different incentive policies, i. Fig. 6 shows that the larger the selfish ratio , the more the dropping events take place and the lower the delivery ratio. On the other hand, when the network is stimulated with some incentive, the delivery ratio will increase. Because different selfish node has different selfish factor, the same incentive can't satisfy all selfish nodes' stimulation conditions in Eq. (4). Therefore, there still exists a small fraction of selfish nodes. Intuitively, when the incentive is higher, the fraction of selfish nodes becomes smaller. By observing the figure, this intuition is corroborated, where the delivery ratio with high incentive is much higher than that with low incentive, and almost approaches to that with no selfish nodes, i.e., = 0, in the DTN network. Therefore, we can be sure that, when choosing a proper incentive, the proposed Pi protocol can effectively stimulate the selfish nodes and improve the performance the DTN network in terms of high delivery ratio.
We further compare the delivery ratios in Group 1 and Group 2 in terms of different velocity. From the comparisons, we can see the delivery ratios in Group 2 are higher than those in Group 1. The reason is that the faster the velocity , the more chances a DTN node can contact with other unselfish DTN nodes in time period ℎ . As a result, the number of dropping events becomes small, and the delivery ratio increases. We also compare the delivery ratios in Group 1 and Group 3 in terms of different number of DTN nodes, and the comparisons show that the increase of DTN node's number will bring a positive affect on the delivery ratios. When the total number of DTN nodes increases, the density of unselfish DTN nodes subsequently increases. Then, a DTN node has more chances to contact with other unselfish DTN nodes, and the delivery ratio increases. The high delivery ratios in Group 4 with = 120, = 80 ± 5 km/h further confirm our observations. Fig. 7 depicts the average delay with 12 hours with different parameter settings. From the figure, we can see when there exist selfish nodes in DTN network, the average delay will decrease. The higher the selfish ratio , the longer the average delay. However, when the network is stimulated with some incentive, the average delay will decrease quickly. Especially, when the high incentive is exercised, i.e., the gaining factor is around 0.7 ∼ 0.8, the average delays can approach to that with no selfish nodes, i.e., = 0, in the DTN network. In addition, comparing the average delays in Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4, when the number of DTN nodes and/or the velocity increase, the average delay can be further reduced.
VI. RELATED WORK
In DTNs, the lack of contemporaneous routing and high variation in network conditions make the selfishness problem very different from the one in traditional wireless ad hoc network, and many existing incentive solutions can not be directly applied to DTNs. Recently, two research works on incentive-aware routing in DTNs have been appeared [13, 14] , which are closely related to the proposed Pi protocol.
In [13] , Shevade et al. first study the impact of selfish behaviors in DTNs. Based on the simulation results, they show that the presence of selfish DTN nodes can greatly degrade total delivered traffic. To mitigate the damage caused by selfish DTN nodes, they use the pair-wise tit-for-tat (TFT) as a simple, robust and practical incentive mechanism for DTNs, and develop an incentive-aware routing protocol that allows selfish DTN nodes to maximize their individual utilities while conforming to TFT constraints. Extensive simulation results are given to show that the TFT mechanism can increase total delivered traffic in the whole DTN network. Although Shevade et al.'s scheme is the first practical incentive-aware routing scheme for DTNs, the security issues lying in the incentive-based DTNs are not addressed in the work. In [14] , Zhu et al. propose a secure multilayer credit-based incentive (SMART) scheme for DTNs affiliated with selfish nodes. In SMART, layered coins are used to provide incentives to selfish DTN nodes for bundle forwarding. In addition, compared with Shevade et al.'s scheme, several security issues lying in DTNs, i.e., credit forgery attack, nodular tontine attack, and submission refusal attack, are addressed in the SMART protocol, and the corresponding countermeasures are also briefly discussed.
Different from the SMART protocol, the proposed Pi protocol focuses on the fairness issue in DTNs. Specifically, we propose a hybrid (credit plus reputation) incentive model with verifiably encrypted signature technique to stimulate the selfish DTN nodes to help forward bundles. To achieve fairness, if and only if the bundles arrive at the destination node, the intermediate forwarding nodes can get credits from the source node. Furthermore, for the failure of bundle forwarding, those intermediate DTN nodes still can get good reputation values from the trusted authority. Therefore, DTN nodes will be more confident in participating in bundle forwarding.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have developed a practical incentive (Pi) protocol to stimulate selfish nodes in order to cooperate in forwarding bundle packets in DTNs. By adopting the proper incentive policy, the proposed Pi protocol can not only improve the whole DTN network's performance in terms of high delivery ratio and low average delay but also achieve the fairness among DTN nodes. Detailed security analyses have shown that the proposed Pi protocol can resist most attacks launched by selfish DTN nodes. In addition, extensive simulations have been conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed Pi protocol. For our future work, we will design the fair incentive protocol for multi-copy algorithms. In addition, we will integrate Pi with anonymity to provide each DTN node's privacy protection.
